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ABSTRACT
As a division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s National Security Branch, the
Terrorist Screening Center maintains the Terrorist Watchlist, a central database for
identifying individuals known or suspected to engage in terrorism or terrorist
activities. Subsumed under the Terrorist Watchlist is the No Fly List, which prohibits
individuals from boarding commercial aircrafts in and out of the United States.
Placement on either list presumes named individuals as a potential threat to U.S.
national security, yet there is no restriction preventing them from legally purchasing
firearms. Following a mass shooting at an Orlando nightclub in June of 2016, which
was perpetrated by an individual recently removed from the Terrorist Watchlist, the
Senate proposed two gun control measures specifically aimed at preventing
individuals on the Terrorist Watchlist from purchasing firearms. Both proposals were
rejected. This article explores the constitutional and procedural concerns that led the
Senate’s rejection of both proposals, and concludes by introducing gun control
regulation tailored to address those concerns.
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INTRODUCTION
HILLARY CLINTON: We need comprehensive
background checks, and we need to keep guns out of the
hands of those who will do harm. And we finally need to
pass a prohibition on anyone who’s on the terrorist
watch list from being able to buy a gun in our country.
If you’re too dangerous to fly, you are too dangerous to
buy a gun. So there are things we can do, and we ought
to do it in a bipartisan way.
*

*

*

*

DONALD TRUMP: First of all, I agree . . . [w]hen a
person is on a watch list or a no-fly list, and I have the
endorsement of the NRA, which I’m very proud of.
These are very, very good people, and they’re
protecting the Second Amendment. But I think we have
to look very strongly at no-fly lists and watch lists.1

I

n February of 2004, the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (“FBI”)
National Instant Criminal Background Check System (“NICS”)
began conducting background checks against Terrorist Watchlist
records.2 Since then, the data shows that individuals on the Terrorist
Watchlist were involved in 2,477 background checks involving the
sale of firearms or explosives.3 Of that number, 91 percent of the
transactions were allowed to proceed.4 In 2015 alone, 223 out of 244
transactions were completed. 5
1

2

3
4
5

Transcript of the First Debate, N.Y. T IMES (Sept. 27, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/27/us/
politics/transcript-debate.html?_r=1
[https://perma.cc/NR94-6QNL].
Letter from Diana C. Maurer, Dir., Homeland Sec. and Justice Issues, to Dianne
Feinstein, Sen., U.S. Senate (Mar. 7, 2016) (on file with author), available at
https://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/
files/serve?File_id=F53C4195-430D-4D8DACDE1EC53E97D0FA&SK=EF4E6FF4158FFA49E570234A3D
E8E438
[https://perma.cc/S4EF-GUGU].
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id. (21 individuals were prohibited from completing the transaction due to
reasons unrelated to the Terrorist Watchlist, e.g., prior felony convictions,
adjudicated mental health, under indictment, etc.).
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As a division of the FBI’s National Security Branch, the Terrorist
Screening Center (“TSC”) maintains the Terrorist Watchlist (“TWL”),
a database containing information on individuals who are known or
reasonably suspected of being involved in terrorist activity.6 Being on
the No Fly List, which is a subset of the TWL, prohibits individuals
from boarding commercial aircrafts in and out of the United States.7
As it stands, these individuals have been deemed too great a threat to
fly and yet there is no restriction preventing them from legally
purchasing firearms. In June 2016, Congress proposed two gun control
measures to prevent known or suspected terrorists from purchasing
firearms.8 The proposals were introduced following a mass shooting in
an Orlando nightclub—perpetrated by an individual recently removed
from the TWL—that left 49 patrons dead.9 Both proposals were
rejected.10 Such a result is unacceptable.
Congress needs to pass gun regulations which disallow known or
suspected terrorists on, or recently removed from, the FBI’s Terrorist
Watchlist, and its subsets, from legally purchasing firearms in the
United States. If the government has deemed certain individuals to be
such a threat to our national security, so much as to prevent them from
flying on commercial aircrafts, common sense dictates these
individuals be prevented from being able to legally purchase firearms,
as well.
Part I of this Article will lay the groundwork for which gun
regulation proposals can firmly stand on. This platform requires an
understanding of the current interpretation of the Second Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution and the operation of the FBI’s TSC. With
respect to both, an exploration into their reach and limitations is
6

7

8

9
10

About the Terrorist Screening Center, U.S. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
https://www.fbi.gov/about/lea dership-and-structure/national-security-branch/tsc
(last visited Oct. 13, 2016) [https://perma.cc/Y3R6-6JBB].
U.S. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, The No Fly List and Selectee Lists,
https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/
about-us/ten-years-after-the-fbi-since-911/just-the-facts-1/terrorist-screening-center-1 (last visited Oct. 13, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/9T93-XFVG].
Donovan Slack, Senate Blocks Gun Measures Offered in Wake of Orlando
Shooting,
USA
TODAY
(June
20,
2016,
9:27
PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2016/06/20/senate-gun-vote-afterorlando-shooting/86143418/ [https://perma.cc/D8DP-AGBQ].
Id.
Id.
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necessary. Additionally, a look into the FBI’s NICS and how it relates
to individuals on the TWL is warranted. Lastly, this foundation will
highlight a correlation between known or suspected terrorists on the
TWL and mass shootings in the United States.
Part II of this Article will begin to build on the footing set by
reviewing two out of four gun control measures proposed by Congress
in June of 2016.11 The proposals are competing measures introduced
for the purpose of providing a uniform procedure on how to handle the
transfer of a firearm when the transferee is an individual on, or
recently removed from, the TWL. Each regulation, and its reason for
rejection, will be analyzed. Part III of this Article introduces a gun
control measure designed to regulate the purchase and sale of firearms
for individuals on the TWL, while also addressing the constitutional
and procedural concerns which led to the rejection of the two June
proposals.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Second Amendment
The Second Amendment of the U.S. Constitution reads: “A wellregulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the
right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.”12
In 2008, in a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court, for the first time,
enforced the Second Amendment as an individual right.13 Prior to the
Court’s decision, the meaning of the Second Amendment was highly
debated; did it protect an individual right to possess a firearm, or was
the right to possess a firearm connected with service in the militia?14
In District of Columbia v. Heller, the respondent brought forth an
action to enjoin the District of Columbia from enforcing a bar on
registering handguns.15 The District Court dismissed the complaint and
respondent appealed the decision to the Circuit Court of Appeals for

11

12
13
14
15

Id. The two gun control measures not being discussed are beyond the scope of
this Article, as they do not specifically address controlling the purchase of
firearms by individuals on the TWL.
U.S. CONST. amend. II.
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
Id. at 577.
Id. at 575-76.
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the District of Columbia.16 The Court of Appeals held that the Second
Amendment provided an individual right to possess firearms and that
the District of Columbia’s total ban on handguns violated that right.17
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address this matter.18
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote the opinion for the majority and
pointed to the history and text of the Second Amendment to ascertain
its meaning.19 In analyzing the text he stated that there are two parts to
the Second Amendment: its prefatory clause, which states “a wellregulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free state,” and
its operative clause, “the right of the people to keep and bear arms,
shall not be infringed.”20 Following his analysis of the text, Scalia
concluded that the operative clause “guarantee[s] [an] individual the
right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation,”21 which
is not limited by the prefatory clause, but rather announces a
purpose.22
Scalia made it blatantly clear that the Second Amendment protects
an individual right to possess firearms, but that that right is not
unlimited:
There seems to us no doubt, on the basis of both text
and history, that the Second Amendment conferred an
individual right to keep and bear arms. Of course the
right was not unlimited, just as the First Amendment’s
right of free speech was not. Thus, we do not read the
Second Amendment to protect the right of citizens to
carry arms for any sort of confrontation, just as we do
not read the First Amendment to protect the right of
citizens to speak for any purpose.23

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 577-80.
Id. at 592.
Id.
Id. at 595.
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Later in his opinion, Scalia expanded on his statement regarding
limitations:
Like most rights, the right secured by the Second
Amendment is not unlimited. Although we do not
undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of the
full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our
opinion should be taken to cast doubt on long standing
prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and
the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of
firearms in sensitive places such as schools and
government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and
qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.24
This passage is significant as it paves a path for Congress to lay
down legislation and restrictions on the purchase and sale of firearms.
Two years after Heller, the Supreme Court, in McDonald v. City of
Chicago,25 rendered the Second Amendment applicable to state
governments via the Fourteenth Amendment.26 As Heller was decided
in the District of Columbia, the majority did not address the issue of
state applicability in its opinion.
In McDonald, residents sued the city of Chicago for its handgun
ban as a violation of their Second Amendment right to possess
firearms.27 Chicago argued that its laws were constitutional because
the Second Amendment did not apply to the States.28 The Supreme
Court heard the case to decide whether the Second Amendment is
applicable to the States under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.29
Deciding this issue in the affirmative, Justice Samuel Alito, who
wrote for the majority, supported his reasoning by looking to Heller.30
As stated in Heller, “[s]elf-defense is a basic right, recognized by
many legal systems from ancient times to the present day . . . [and that

24
25
26
27
28
29
30

Id. at 626-27.
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
Id. at 750.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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basic right] is ‘the central component’ of the Second Amendment
right.”31 Alito states:
Heller makes it clear that this right is deeply rooted in this Nation’s
history and tradition. Heller explored the right’s origins, noting that
the 1689 English Bill of Rights explicitly protected a right to keep
arms for self-defense, and that by 1765, Blackstone was able to assert
that the right to keep and bear arms was one of the fundamental rights
of Englishmen.32
Reflecting on the history highlighted in Heller, Alito pronounces,
“It is clear that the Framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment
counted the right to keep and bear arms among those fundamental
rights necessary to our system of ordered liberty.”33 Accordingly, the
Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
incorporates the Second Amendment right to possess firearms.34
Thus, the current understanding of the Second Amendment is that
it protects an individual right to possess firearms, and that that right is
applicable to the States under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. However, this protected right is not
unlimited.
B. The FBI’s Terrorist Screening Center
The FBI’s TSC was established in 2003 in the wake of the 9/11
terrorist attacks.35 The TSC maintains the TWL, a consolidated
database of information identifying individuals known or suspected to
be engaged in terrorism or terrorist activities.36 The TWL serves as a
bridge between multiple government agencies, i.e., Homeland
Security, Law Enforcement, the Intelligence Community, and
international partners.37
Before adding a name to the TWL, there is a vetting process by
numerous U.S. governmental agencies.38 Once vetting is complete, the
31
32
33
34
35
36

37
38

Id. at 767.
Id. at 768.
Id. at 778.
Id.
About the Terrorist Screening Center, supra note 6.
Terrorist Screening Center – FAQs, U.S. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/terrorist-screening-center-frequently-askedquestions.pdf/view (last visited Oct. 13, 2016) [https://perma.cc/WH2Q-LAH3].
About the Terrorist Screening Center, supra note 6.
Id.
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agencies will submit recommendations to the National
Counterterrorism Center (“NCTC”), 39 who then reviews the
information provided to determine whether there is a factual basis to
suspect the person is a known or suspected terrorist.40 If the
information is sufficient, the person is entered into the Terrorist
Identities Datamart Environment (“TIDE”).41 That information is then
circulated to the FBI to include the individual on the TWL.42 Upon
receiving this information, the FBI will conduct another review to
verify the person meets the standard set for inclusion on the TWL.43
The standard set for including an individual on the TWL is
reasonable suspicion that the person in question is a known or
suspected terrorist.44 To meet this standard, agencies submitting
recommendations must rely upon:
articulable intelligence or information which, taken
together with rational inference from those facts,
reasonably warrants a determination that an individual
is known or suspected to be or have been knowingly
engaged in conduct constituting, in preparation for, in
aid of, or related to terrorism or terrorist activities.
Based on the totality of the circumstances, a
nominating agency must provide an objective factual
39

40
41

42
43
44

Terrorist Screening Center – FAQs, supra note 36 (recommendations based
solely on race, ethnicity, national origin, religious affiliation, or First
Amendment-protected activities are not accepted).
Id.
Id. As of June 2016, TIDE contained roughly 1.5 million people, including
approximately 15,000 U.S. persons.
Id.
Id.
Id. (The FBI defines a “known terrorist” as “an individual whom the U.S.
Government knows is engaged, has been engaged, or who intends to engage in
terrorism and/or terrorist activity, including an individual (a) who has been
charged, arrested, indicted, or convicted for a crime related to terrorism by U.S.
Government or foreign government authorities; or (b) identified as a terrorist or
member of a designated foreign terrorist organization pursuant to statute,
Executive Order or international legal obligation pursuant to a United Nations
Security Council Resolution.” The FBI defines a “suspected terrorist” as “an
individual who is reasonably suspected to be, or has been, engaged in conduct
constituting, in preparation for, in aid of, or related to terrorism and/or terrorist
activities based on an articulable and reasonable suspicion.”).
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basis to believe an individual is a known or suspected
terrorist.45
After reviewing the information to ensure the recommended
individual meets the standard set forth, the individual will be added to
the TWL.46
The FBI also monitors the No Fly List, a subset of the TWL. 47 The
No Fly List prohibits individuals who may present a threat to “civil
aviation” or “national security” from boarding commercial aircrafts
flying into, out of, over, or within U.S. airspace; this includes
international flights operated by U.S. carriers.48 For an individual to be
included on the No Fly List, there must be credible information
demonstrating that such person poses a threat of “committing a violent
act of terrorism with respect to civil aviation, the homeland, United
States interests located abroad, or is operationally capable of doing
so.”49
The FBI monitors both the TWL and the No Fly List to ensure
their accuracy.50 However, in a 2005 audit of the TSC by the U.S.
Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General (“OIG”), it was
reported that the TSC was riddled with inaccurate and inconsistent
information.51 Concerned with its findings, the OIG made
recommendations for mitigating the faults of the system and a new
audit was scheduled for 2007.52 During its follow-up audit, the OIG
reported progress by the FBI in its effort to ensure the quality of the
data on the TWL, but found lingering errors.53 Such errors included
inappropriately watchlisting individuals, failing to adequately identify
known or suspected terrorists, failing to undertake watchlist redress,
failing to discard duplicate records, and inconsistencies in the FBI’s
45
46
47
48
49
50
51

52
53

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. AUDIT DIV., Follow-Up
Audit
of
the
Terrorist
Screening
Center,
https://oig.justice.gov/reports/FBI/a0741/final.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/QU3Y-RKQZ].
Id.
Id.
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procedure for processing watchlist data.54 At the end of its report, the
OIG provided another set of recommendations for closing the gaps
found in the TSC.55
The FBI is aware of the faults present within the TSC and TWL,
and has undertaken a range of measures to ensure the information
provided is accurate and timely.56 Such measures include: regular
reviews, periodic audits, and post-encounter reviews. 57 The FBI and
nominating agencies perform these tasks to ensure the information
continues to satisfy the standards set for inclusion.58 It goes without
saying that it is imperative that this information be as accurate and
consistent as humanly possible. As the OIG stated in its audit report,
“a single omission of a terrorist identity or an inaccuracy in the
identifying information contained in a watchlist record can have
enormous consequences.”59
C. The FBI’s National Instant Criminal Background Check
System
In 1993, the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (“Brady
Act”) 60 was enacted to provide for a waiting period before firearms
were purchased, and for establishing a national criminal background
check system.61 Authorized by the Brady Act, the FBI’s NICS was
established for Federal Firearms Licensees (“FFLs”) to contact the FBI
for the purpose of acquiring information on intended transferees in
order to determine whether a transfer would violate 18 U.S.C., § 922
(g) or (n).62
54
55
56
57

58
59
60

61

62

Id.
Id.
Terrorist Screening Center – FAQs, supra note 36.
Id. An encounter is where an individual is identified during a screening process
as a potential match for someone identified on the TWL. This can occur during
an individual’s attempt to board an aircraft, apply for a passport or visa, or has
an interaction with law enforcement.
Id.
Follow-up Audit of the Terrorist Screening Center, supra note 51.
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536
(1993).
About
NICS,
U.S.
FED.
BUREAU
OF
INVESTIGATION,
https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/nics/about-nics (last visited Oct. 18, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/NT8P-9GLP].
Id.
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The NICS is a national system which searches available records on
potential transferees in order to determine whether an individual is
disqualified from procuring a firearm.63 The prohibitive criteria for
disqualifying individuals is outlined in 18 U.S.C., § 922 (g) & (n).64 If
an intended transferee matches one of the categories delineated, the
transaction is prohibited from completing. Under 18 U.S.C., § 922 (g)
& (n), it is unlawful for persons who: are fugitives; have been
adjudicated as a mental defective; are aliens and illegally or unlawfully
in the United States; or have been convicted for using or possessing a
controlled substance within a certain time period to possess or receive
any firearm.65 The preceding list is not exhaustive; rather it is a mere
glimpse into the prohibitive measures taken to prevent persons from
possessing or receiving a firearm.66 If an intended transferee is denied
the transfer of a firearm, (s)he can seek remedial action under section
103(g) of the Brady Act and pursue a remedy for erroneous
deprivation under 18 U.S.C. § 925A.67
In order to qualify or disqualify individuals from purchasing
firearms, the NICS cross-checks available records with descriptive
information provided to them by FFLs.68 This procedure, and the
NICS system, was developed by the FBI, the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (“ATF”), and local and state
enforcement agencies.69 The system itself is computerized and is
designed to provide results instantaneously on background check
inquiries.
In Calendar Year 2015, the NICS Contacted Call Centers handled
calls an average of 141 seconds. After transferring the calls to the
NICS Section,70 the wait and processing time averaged 446.3 seconds.

63
64
65
66
67
68

69
70

Id.
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 922(g), (n).
Id. (see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and (n) for full list of prohibitive criteria.).
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act § 103(g); 18 U.S.C. § 925A.
About NICS, supra note 61 (FFLs gather this information from intended
transferees during the purchase process as required by the ATF).
Id.
Id. (NICS Section processes background checks for FFLs when a state declines
to serve as the point of contact for the NICS).
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When firearm background checks were conducted via the NICS Echeck,71 the wait and processing time averaged 107.5 seconds.72
Once results are received, and so long as there are no matching
records returned by any of the databases warranting delay, FFLs may
proceed with the transfer.73
When the NICS returns a match between an intended transferee’s
descriptive information with available records located in the databases,
the transaction will be briefly delayed.74 When this occurs, FFLs will
be transferred to NICS Section, where the information will be
reviewed and evaluated by a NICS Legal Instruments Examiner.75 A
NICS Legal Examiner has access to protected information and will
review the information provided on the intended transferee to
determine if prohibitive criteria exists to deny the purchase. 76 If a
NICS Legal Examiner does not find the existence of prohibitive
criteria, FFLs may proceed with the transfer.77
If a NICS Legal Examiner does find prohibitive criteria, there
exists two possible outcomes: denial, or delay.78 When a NICS Legal
Examiner finds the existence of criteria for prohibiting the transfer of a
firearm, FFLs will be instructed to deny the transfer. However, if
“potentially”79 prohibitive criteria exists, and more information is
required to make a determination, FFLs will be advised that the
firearm transaction will be delayed.80 A delay only lasts for three
business days, and after that, if a final determination has not been
71

72
73

74
75
76
77
78
79

80

Id. (NICS E-check allows FFLs to initiate an unassisted NICS background check
via the internet).
Id.
Id. While it is impressive that a computerized system checks for available
records within two minutes so that a transfer can be made, it is equally alarming
that within two minutes time a computerized system is relied on to decide
whether a firearm transfer should proceed.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
About NICS, supra note 61 (potentially prohibitive information exists when the
NICS indicates the subject of the background check has matched similar
descriptive features in the system, i.e., name, sex, race, etc.).
Id.
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rendered by the NICS, it is within a FFLs discretion whether to
proceed with the firearm transfer, subject to state law.81
D. NICS and the Terrorist Watchlist
In November 2003, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) directed
the FBI to reform the NICS’ procedures to include measures to screen
prospective firearm transferees against the TWL.82 Less than four
months later, the FBI began cross-checking background checks for
firearms against the TWL.83 When a TWL match occurs, the NICS
delays the transfer for the requisite three business days. 84 During the
interim, NICS contacts the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division to
research for any unknown prohibiting factors.85 If the FBI fails to
uncover any prohibiting factors after the allotted time, FFLs may
proceed with the transfer at their discretion.86 Following the
conclusion of the requisite delay period, the FBI continues working on
the case for up to 90 days in case information arises which authorizes a
final determination.87
So, while there is a system in place to prevent known or suspected
terrorists from purchasing firearms, it appears weak. Individuals are
placed on the TWL because the FBI has been provided with specific
and articulable intelligence warranting their inclusion.88 Yet, the FBI’s
Counterterrorism Division is only given three business days to prohibit
the transfer of a firearm to an individual on the TWL.89 It seems
illogical that the procedures set forth for individuals believed likely to
engage in terrorist activities be held to the same nominal standard for
intended transferees under no investigation.90 Furthermore, there does
81
82

83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90

Id.
William J. Krouse, Terrorist Watch List Screening and Background Checks for
Firearms,
CONG.
RESEARCH
SERV.
(May
1,
2013),
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/209937.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WC72-3GAF].
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
Krouse, supra note 82, at 13.
See supra notes 61 & 82 and accompanying text.
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not seem to be any procedures in place for prohibiting the transfer of a
firearm to persons recently removed from the TWL or its subset, the
No Fly List. Congress should enact legislation which heightens the
standard for transferring firearms to known or suspected terrorists on,
or recently removed from, the TWL.
E. Current Events
The United States is no stranger to mass shootings; in 2016 alone,
there were 384.91 Mass shootings, and the events proceeding them,
have become almost routine: shooting occurs, people die, families
mourn, debate commences on gun regulation, Congress fails to act,
and repeat. Recent mass shootings have generated discussion on
enacting gun regulation to prevent individuals on the TWL and its
subset, the No Fly List, from purchasing firearms.
The first of two events to spark this conversation was a mass
shooting which occurred in San Bernardino, California. On December
2, 2015, a married couple, Syed Rizwan Farook and Tashfeen Malik,
opened fire on a holiday work party resulting in the death of fourteen
people.92 The attack was carried out with assault rifles and semiautomatic handguns.93 During a subsequent investigation, the FBI
revealed that all of the couple’s guns were bought legally. Farook had
purchased two 9-millimeter handguns used in the attack, but it was
unclear how Farook and Malik obtained the assault rifles as a nonparticipator in the attack originally purchased them.94 While these
individuals were not on any watchlist, the investigation uncovered that
the perpetrators declared allegiance to the Islamic State prior to the
attack.95
Following the investigation, Senate proposed and rejected two gun
control measures focused on preventing individuals on the TWL from

91

92

93
94
95

Past
Summary
Ledgers,
GUN
VIOLENCE
ARCHIVE,
http://www.gunviolencearchive.org/past-tolls (last visited Apr. 27, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/BGJ8-3M34].
Michael S. Schmidt & Richard Pérez-Peña, F.B.I. Treating San Bernardino
Attack as Terrorism Case, N. Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/05/us/tashfeen-malik-islamic-state.html
[https:// perma.cc/69MH-AUG2].
Id.
Id.
Id.
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purchasing firearms.96 Democratic Senator, Dianne Feinstein proposed
one measure which was rejected on a 54-45 vote, while Republican
Senator, John Cornyn’s competing measure was rejected on a 55-45
vote.97 As this issue was left unresolved, the doors remained open for
another attack to take place.
Not even seven months removed from San Bernardino, forty-nine
people were killed in the largest modern day mass shooting when
Omar Mateen opened fire at the Pulse Nightclub (“Pulse”) in Orlando,
Florida.98 The attack occurred in the earlier hours of June 12, 2016,
when Mateen entered Pulse with two weapons he had legally
purchased just one-week prior. 99 Records reveal that Mateen
possessed a valid firearm license and had done so since September
2011.100
During the course of the shooting, Mateen phoned 911 to identify
himself and pledge allegiance to the Islamic State, prompting an
investigation by the FBI.101 As a result of the investigation, FBI
Director, James B. Comey, released information regarding Mateen’s
placement on the TWL in 2013 and 2014.102 In 2013, the FBI
investigated Mateen after he claimed to have ties to two terrorist
groups, al-Qaida and Hezbollah.103 Mateen was on the TWL for ten
months before being removed.104 Approximately one-year later, the
FBI placed Mateen back on the TWL while investigating persons with
96
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100
101
102
103
104
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possible ties to a U.S. citizen who blew himself up in a suicide attack
in Syria.105 Finding no connection, the FBI once again removed
Mateen from the TWL.106
The announcement of Mateen’s placement and subsequent removal
from the TWL, coupled with his ability to legally purchase firearms
sparked outrage. It had been just seven months since the San
Bernardino shooting, and the nation found itself in the midst of another
mass shooting revolution. Would this be the event that broke the
cycle? Congress answers that question in the negative.
II. FAILED GUN REGULATIONS AND THE TERRORIST WATCHLIST
A. Analysis
On June 13, 2016, the morning after the Orlando mass shooting,
newspaper headlines across the country were of no surprise: “An Act
of Terror and Act of Hate”; “A Night of Terror in Orlando”;
“Deadliest Day”; “Massacre in the Night.”107 Sadly, neither were the
headlines on June 20, 2016: “Senate Votes Down Gun Control
Proposals in Wake of Orlando Shootings”; “Senate Rejects Series of
Gun Measures”; “Senate Rejects 4 Gun Proposals Inspired by Orlando
Attack”; “Senate Rejects 4 Measures to Control Gun Sales.”108 Why is
this of no surprise? Because Congress repeatedly fails to pass
105
106
107
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legislation aimed to regulate the purchase and sales of firearms. “Over
just the past five years, lawmakers have introduced more than 100 gun
control proposals in Congress, since Gabrielle Gifford and 18 other
people were shot in Tucson, Arizona in January 2011.”109 “Not one of
them has been passed into law, and very few of the proposals even
made it to the House or Senate Floor.”110
After the Orlando shooting, four gun-control proposals made it to
the Senate floor, but not without protest. Democratic Senator,
Christopher S. Murphy led a 15-hour filibuster111 in order to get a
commitment from majority leaders to hold votes on two gun control
amendments favored by the Democrats.112 Eventually, a few days
later, on June 20, 2016, the Senate voted on all four gun control
proposals, two brought forth by Democrats and two by Republicans.113
All four were rejected.114 Two of the amendments proposed focused
on expanding background checks and are outside the scope of this
Article.115 The other two amendments, which are discussed below,
focus on prohibiting individuals on the TWL from purchasing
firearms.116
109

110

111

112

113
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116
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The first proposal comes from Democratic Senator, Dianne
Feinstein. Her amendment echoes her rejected measure from
December of 2015.117 The second proposal comes from Republican
Senator, John Cornyn, who also renewed his competing measure from
December 2015.118
B. Feinstein’s Proposal – S. Amdt. 4720
The first amendment heard by the Senate came from Democratic
Senator, Dianne Feinstein. The purpose of her proposed amendment
was to grant the Attorney General authority to deny requests to
transfer firearms to known or suspected terrorists.119 In pertinent part,
her amendment states:
The Attorney General may deny the transfer of a
firearm if the Attorney General determines, based on
the totality of the circumstances, that the transferee
represents a threat to public safety based on a
reasonable suspicion that the transferee is engaged, or
has been engaged, in conduct constituting, in
preparation for, in aid of, or related to terrorism, or
providing material support or resources therefor.120
If a denial does take place, the transferee may pursue a remedy121
for erroneous denial.122 The latter part of Feinstein’s amendment
proposes that procedures should be established so that the Attorney
General, or a designee of the Attorney General, shall be notified of an
attempted purchase if an individual who is, or within the last five years
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has been, under investigation for conduct related to a Federal Crime of
Terrorism, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5).123
In order to clear procedural hurdles, Feinstein’s proposal needed a
three-fifths majority vote to carry on.124 She fell short of this feat as
her proposal only received 47 votes for and 53 against.125 Following its
failure to proceed, a voice vote was held and the amendment was
tabled.126
Out of the 53 votes casted against the amendment, 52 came from
Republican Senators.127 The main argument Republicans offered for
rejecting the bill was that it paints with too broad of a brush and takes
away persons’ constitutional rights for procedural due process; that is,
it first bans them from purchasing firearms, then allows them to
challenge the denial in court.128 In conjunction, Republicans also had a
lingering concern over whether the process for appeal would be
satisfactory to assist those erroneously affected.129
Republicans’ rejection of Feinstein’s proposal suggests that a
person’s procedural due process rights will be violated if a denial of
transfer takes place before they are properly adjudicated.130 While the
Republicans present a valid point, such a concern is not so clear-cut.131
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that
“No person shall be . . . deprived life, liberty or property, without due
123
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process of law.”132 When speaking about the application of the Due
Process Clause the Supreme Court stated, “due process, unlike some
legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated
to time, place and circumstances. Due process is flexible and calls for
such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.”133
These remarks both limit and broaden the scope of the Fifth
Amendment’s procedural protections based on the circumstances at
hand. The application is not rigid, but rather, it is malleable. Thus, it is
less convincing for Republicans to slap a due process label on
Feinstein’s amendment and reject it without a proper evaluation of the
particular situation.
In Mathew v. Eldridge, the Supreme Court introduced a threefactor balancing test to analyze procedural due process claims to assist
in resolving whether procedures provided for are constitutionally
sufficient.134 The three-factor balancing test requires the following
analysis:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirements would entail.135
In 2011, this balancing test was applied in Kuck v. Danaher, which
sought to determine whether the Connecticut Department of Public
Safety’s (“DPS”) procedure for renewing permits to carry firearms
violated applicants’ procedural due process.136 In Kuck, the appellant
centered his argument on the denial of his firearm permit, and the
excessive delay in obtaining an appeal hearing.137 In applying
Mathews’ balancing test, the court specifically focused on the second
factor: the overall risk of erroneous deprivation of an applicant’s
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property interest and the time-period required to correct such
deprivation.138 In discussing the second factor the court stated,
Broadly speaking, a delay amounts to a due process violation only
where it renders the prescribed procedures meaningless in relation to
the private interests at stake. The mere assertion that state remedies are
lengthy will not render state remedies inadequate under the Due
Process Clause unless they are inadequate to the point that they are
meaningless or nonexistent.139
Unable to account for a waiting period of a year and a half for an
appeal hearing, the court found the DPS’ procedure to be in violation
of the appellant’s due process.140
Comparatively, the DPS’ procedure for permit renewals differs
from Feinstein’s proposed procedure for denying a suspected
terrorist’s purchase of firearms. However, the two can be likened by
the complaints brought forward. In Kuck, the allegations of due
process violations were two-fold: (1) the denial of a permit to carry a
firearm, and (2) a prolonged subsequent remedial measure.141
Similarly, under Feinstein’s proposal, an anticipated procedural due
process claim, hinted to by Republicans, would be the same: (1) denial
to purchase a firearm, and (2) a subsequent remedial measure. A
procedural due process analysis as prescribed in Mathews is
necessary.142
The first step in Mathews’ balancing test looks at the effects that
official actions will have on the private interest. Here, hypothetically
speaking, it is the transferee’s property interest which is at stake. The
property interest is the transferee’s right to bear arms: a fundamental
right under the Second Amendment as applied to the States by the
Fourteenth Amendment.143 There can be no doubt that such an interest
exists and is affected by Feinstein’s proposal.
The second step requires an analysis of the erroneous deprivation
of a transferee’s property interest through the procedures provided for,
and the probable value of, alternative procedures.144 As stated above,
138
139
140
141
142
143
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the procedures in Feinstein’s proposal allows the DOJ to deny the
purchase of a firearm if the Attorney General determines, based on the
totality of the circumstances, that the transferee represents a threat to
public safety based on a reasonable suspicion that the transferee is or
has been engaged in conduct constituting the preparation or aiding of
activity related to terrorism.145 The deprivation becomes erroneous
when an intended transferee is incorrectly denied when attempting to
purchase a firearm.146
As discussed above, the TWL is not perfect, making it likely that
such a deprivation will occur.147 However, just because an erroneous
deprivation takes place prior to adjudication, does not necessarily
mean it is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court has held that “the
Constitution requires some kind of a hearing before the State deprives
a person of liberty or property.”148 However, in some circumstances,
“the Court has held that a statutory provision for a post deprivation
hearing . . . for erroneous deprivation, satisfies due process.”149
Such was the case in Hightower v. City of Boston, where a former
member of the Boston Police Department (“BPD”) brought forth a
procedural due process claim alleging that a statutory scheme revoking
her license to carry a Class A firearm prior to adjudication was
inadequate.150 The Court upheld the statutory scheme as procedurally
sufficient since the statute provided a post-deprivation process, which
allowed aggrieved parties to file a petition to obtain judicial review in
the district court within 90 days after notice of the revocation.151
Likewise, Feinstein’s proposal provides a scheme for a postdeprivation hearing for transferees erroneously affected.152 The
available remedial procedures are laid out in § 103(g) of Public Law
103-159, and the intended transferee can pursue a remedy for
erroneous denial under 18 U.S.C. § 925A.153 The remedial procedure
calls for the transferee to submit information to correct the erroneous
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
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information preventing the purchase from being approved.154 Upon
receiving that information, “the Attorney General shall immediately
consider the information, investigate the matter further, and correct all
erroneous federal records relating to the prospective transferee and
give notice of the error to any federal department or agency or any
state that was the source of such erroneous records.”155 Furthermore, a
transferee may take action against the DOJ in order to direct them to
correct the information and approve the transfer.156
The final factor in Mathews’ balancing test requires an
examination of the governmental interest in Feinstein’s proposal. Here,
the government’s interest is public safety. More specifically, its
interest concerns stopping suspected terrorists from legally purchasing
firearms that are likely to be used to inflict harm on society. Such an
interest is strong, compelling, and necessary. But, is it justified?
There can be no doubt that the procedures set forth in Feinstein’s
proposal may erroneously deprive intended transferees of their
property interest in purchasing firearms. However, the deprivation is
minimal in comparison to the governmental interest, especially
considering the immediacy in which a post deprivation hearing would
occur. When balancing the erroneous deprivation with the
governmental interest at hand, it is likely that the remedial measures
proposed comports with the circumstances in which a post deprivation
hearing would be constitutionally sufficient under the Due Process
Clause.
Stepping away from the legal analysis and into prospective
application, would there be a chance that some individuals would be
erroneously affected? Absolutely; but, there would also be a chance
that the precautionary measures proposed could help stop another
terrorist attack, and if that is the case, requiring a balancing test seems
unnecessary.
C. Cornyn’s Proposal – S. Amdt. 4749
Republican Senator, John Cornyn introduced a competing measure
after Feinstein’s amendment was tabled.157 The overall purpose of his
154
155
156
157
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amendment aimed to secure the United States from terrorists by
enhancing law enforcement detection.158
Cornyn’s proposal calls on the Attorney General to establish a
process in which “the Attorney General and Federal, State, and local
law enforcement are immediately notified, as appropriate, of any
request to transfer a firearm or explosive to a person who is, or within
the previous 5 years was, investigated as a known or suspected
terrorist.”159 Unlike Feinstein’s proposal, the intended transferee
would not be denied a firearm upfront, but instead allows the Attorney
General to delay the transfer of the firearm for a period not exceeding
three business days.160 Within that time, the Attorney General may file
an emergency petition to prevent the transfer of the firearm from being
completed.161 With regard to the hearing, Cornyn’s proposal states that
the petition and subsequent hearing will receive the highest possible
priority on the docket of the court rendering the decision.162 The
proposal goes on to state that the transferee will receive actual notice
of the hearing, and will have the opportunity to participate with
counsel, thus satisfying due process requirements.163
The final portion of Cornyn’s amendment speaks to the burden of
proof the government would have to satisfy in order to prevent a
transfer from being completed. The amendment states that “the
emergency petition shall be granted if the court finds that there is
probable cause to believe that the transferee has committed, conspired
to commit, attempted to commit, or will commit an act of
terrorism.”164
Like Feinstein’s amendment, Cornyn’s proposal failed to meet the
requisite majority vote needed to clear procedural hurdles. Cornyn
received 53 votes in favor of his proposal, and 47 against.165 Forty-two
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of the votes rejecting Cornyn’s proposal came from Democrats.166
Admittedly, it is surprising that Cornyn’s proposal failed to meet 60
votes, especially considering his amendment secured the endorsement
of the National Rifle Association.167 Nevertheless, the majority of
Democratic senators felt that the amendment placed too high of a
burden on the Attorney General to prevent a firearm transfer within
such a short period of time.168
As stated above, Cornyn’s amendment, if it had been enacted,
would have allowed a court to grant the emergency petition denying an
intended transferee’s purchase of a firearm if it found probable cause
to believe the transferee had engaged in, or would engage in an act of
terrorism.169 Probable cause exists where “the facts and circumstances
within the [Attorney General’s] knowledge and of which [there] is
reasonably trustworthy information sufficient in themselves to warrant
a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is
being committed.”170 In evaluating whether the Attorney General has
met this burden a court looks at the totality of the circumstances.171 A
totality of the circumstances analysis calls for an assessment which
balances the “relative weights of all the various indicia of reliability”
stemming from the DOJ.172
The existence of probable cause is perfectly demonstrated in
Draper v. United States.173 In Draper, an informant had provided
information to a federal narcotics agent, Marsh, about an individual
suspected of peddling narcotics from Chicago to Denver by train.174
The information provided to Marsh was very specific.175 The
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informant was able to provide Marsh with the suspect’s expected
arrival day into Denver, the clothing he would be wearing, the bag he
would be carrying, and the quickness in which he would be moving
through the train station.176 Acting on the informant’s tip, Marsh went
to the train station on both days provided to him.177 On the second day,
Marsh saw an individual matching the description provided to him by
the informant.178 The individual had the same physical attributes and
same clothing, and was moving hurriedly through the train station after
exiting a track in which the incoming train was from Chicago.179
Marsh approached the suspect, uncovered several envelopes
containing heroin, and arrested him on the spot.180 The arrestee
claimed that Marsh lacked probable cause because the information he
had was insufficient to prove that he had violated or was violating the
narcotic laws.181 In response, the Court stated, “In dealing with
probable cause, as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities.
These are not technical; they are the factual and practical
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men,
not legal technicians act.”182 Thus, looking at the facts and
circumstances as a whole, including the relative weight of all the
various indicia of reliability, the Court determined that probable cause
existed.183
Draper illustrates the facts and circumstances expected to be
present in order for a court to find the existence of probable cause.184
One can imagine the difficulty the DOJ would have in putting together
such a case on an individual in just three business days. Regardless of
the flexibility of the probable cause application, such a task will be too
tall to overcome. Due to this obvious roadblock, Democrats denied
Cornyn’s proposal.185
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Given only three business days, it is understandable how such a
time restraint can decrease the likeliness of a successful case being
built. It is not as though the Attorney General is actively building a
case on every individual on the TWL. It is only when the transfer of a
firearm is attempted would the DOJ receive notice and initiate its
investigation to prevent the transfer. Needless to say, Democrats’ issue
with Cornyn’s proposed burden of proof is reasonable; yet, offering a
probable cause standard was logical.
The current standard for placing individuals on the TWL is
reasonable suspicion.186 First pronounced in Terry v. Ohio,187 the
standard requires that an officer have articulable and specific facts
which give rise to reasonable suspicion that a crime is being
committed in order to justify a brief detention of an individual.188 The
Supreme Court recognized reasonable suspicion to be a less
demanding standard than probable cause.189 The FBI has adopted this
standard for purposes of including individuals on the TWL.190 This
shines a light on why Cornyn may have chosen probable cause to be
the standard in his proposal. It does not make sense to use the same
standard for placing an individual on the TWL and for preventing one
of these individuals from purchasing a firearm. In theory, everyone on
the TWL would be prevented from purchasing a firearm just because
they meet the status quo. There can be no doubt that a burden higher
than reasonable suspicion is required to prevent the transfer of a
firearm. Perhaps the establishment of an intermediate standard
applicable to individuals on the TWL is warranted.
Use of an intermediate standard between probable cause and
reasonable suspicion is not a new concept. In Griffin v. Wisconsin,191
the Supreme Court recognized the State of Wisconsin’s use of a
“reasonable grounds” standard within its probationary system—as a
replacement for probable cause—to justify a search of a probationer’s
home.192 In Griffin, the State’s operation of its probationary system
subjects probationers to conditions set by the court and rules and
186
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188
189
190
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regulations established by the State Department of Health and Social
Services.193 One regulation permits probation officers to search a
probationer’s home without a warrant so long as his supervisor
approves and as long as there are “reasonable grounds” to believe
there is presence of contraband.194 In upholding Wisconsin’s
“reasonable grounds” standard, the Court stated that they find it
unnecessary to embrace a new principle of law, but that it has
permitted exceptions when “special needs, beyond the normal need for
law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement
impracticable.”195 The Court defines the “special needs” in Griffin to
be the supervision of probationers to ensure the protection of the
public from harm.196
The “special needs” discussed in Griffin is analogous to the
circumstances surrounding known or suspected terrorists on the
TWL.197 The FBI supervises individuals they have deemed a potential
threat in order to protect the public from harm. To ensure this
protection, it is imperative to regulate the transfer of firearms to
anyone on the TWL. Cornyn’s proposal attempts to balance these
needs, while also protecting the Second Amendment rights of anyone
erroneously placed on the TWL. Conceivably, introducing a unique
standard could help achieve this goal.
Similar to Griffin, the Supreme Court in New Jersey v. T.L.O.198
allowed a showing of less than probable cause to justify searching
students on school grounds who were likely to have engaged in
conduct detrimental to the school’s policies and procedures.199 The
Court stated that the legality of such a search should “depend simply
on the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search.”200
Furthering the standard announced, the Court held “where a careful
balancing of governmental and private interests suggests that the
public interest is best served by a . . . standard of reasonableness that
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stops short of probable cause, we have not hesitated to adopt such a
standard.” 201
Given the decisions in both Griffin and T.L.O., it is apparent that
the Supreme Court has recognized and accepted an intermediate
standard between probable cause and reasonable suspicion when
warranted. This intermediate ground is one of reasonableness. Without
clearly delineating a rule, the Supreme Court has carved out this
exception when it has been for the greater good of the public’s interest.
This standard speaks to permitting a governmental or regulatory action
when a court or an administration find it reasonable, under all of the
circumstances, that some negative event, or act, has or is likely to
occur.
In the case of an emergency petition being sought after in order to
prevent the transfer of a firearm to an individual on the TWL, it should
fall upon the deciding court whether it is reasonable to conclude that
the intended transferee is likely to commit an act of terror. Such a
standard would provide the DOJ the ability to build an effective case
in order to prevent the transfer. In aiming to protect the public from
another tragic attack by individuals investigated for terrorism, a
standard focusing on reasonableness, rather than probable cause,
seems justifiable.
III. PROPOSING COMMON SENSE GUN CONTROL REGULATION
Democrats seem to find reason to continuously reject gun control
measures sponsored by Republicans, and vice versa. Repeatedly, the
two parties fail to act as a bipartisanship and as a result the country
suffers. To outsiders looking in, the two parties are more focused on
disapproving one another’s agenda, rather than acting cohesively to
push for sensible gun control regulation. The two proposed
amendments above exemplify this behavior. Republicans raised due
process concerns they found in Feinstein’s proposal, while Democrats
took issue with the burden of proof set in Cornyn’s proposal.202 Based
on the concerns and considerations above, and in conjunction with the
rejected measures, the following gun control regulation is proposed:
1. The Attorney General and the Federal, State, and local law
enforcement shall be promptly notified of any request to
201
202
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transfer a firearm or explosive to a person who is, or within the
previous five (5) years was, investigated as a known or
suspected terrorist.
2. Upon receiving notification, the Attorney General may delay
the transfer of the firearm or explosive for a period not to
exceed thirty (30) days. If there is no cause for delay, the
transfer may proceed at the Federal Firearm Licensee’s
discretion.
3. At any point within or up to the thirty (30) days provided for
delay, the Attorney General may file a petition to prevent the
transfer of the firearm within a court of competent jurisdiction.
The petition and the subsequent hearing shall receive the
highest possible priority on the docket; which shall not exceed
sixty (60) days from the initial attempted firearm purchase and
transfer.
4. The intended transferee will receive actual notice of the
hearing and will be provided an opportunity to participate with
legal counsel.
5. The court shall grant the petition if it determines that there is
reasonable cause to believe, given the totality of the
circumstances, that the intended transferee represents a threat
to public safety, or has committed, has attempted and/or
conspired to commit, or will commit an act of terrorism.
6. Denial by the court pursuant to this provision will equate to a
determination that a transfer of a firearm or explosive would
violate 18 U.S.C., 922 § (g) or (n).
Section one of the proposal sets the parameters of who the
amendment will affect. The goal is to prevent known or suspected
terrorists from purchasing firearms. Both of the rejected measures
above call for the Attorney General to be notified if someone currently
on the TWL, or recently removed within the previous five years,
attempts to purchase a firearm. This is a sound policy. The Orlando
shooting illustrates the reasoning for such latitude. Mateen was twice
removed from the TWL.203 One year following his second removal,
Mateen legally purchased multiple firearms that he used during his
203
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attack.204 If this policy was in place in June of 2016, not only would
the Attorney General have received notification, but it is also likely
that the NICS would have had proper grounds to delay, or even deny,
the transaction. For that reason, it is necessary the regulation
encompasses individuals on or recently removed from the TWL.
Sections two through six outline the procedures for delaying the
transfer, and subsequent steps to prevent the transfer completely.
Section two of the proposal focuses on implementing a thirty-day
delay for anyone on or recently removed from the TWL. Both of the
rejected proposals pursued different effects: one called for a denial and
the other a delay.205 Seemingly, an initial delay, rather than denial, is
the better of the two options. NICS’ current procedure and Cornyn’s
rejected measure, called for a three-business day delay.206 This is
inadequate. The DOJ should be given thirty days to build its case. The
Supreme Court has found post deprivation hearings to be
constitutionally sufficient under certain circumstances.207 A thirty-day
delay is not likely to amount to a violation of a transferee’s due
process. Addressing this issue in Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Mallen, the
Supreme Court stated:
[E]ven though there is a point at which an unjustified
delay in completing a post-deprivation proceeding
would become a constitutional violation, the
significance of such a delay cannot be evaluated in a
vacuum. In determining how long a delay is justified in
affording a post-suspension hearing and decision, it is
appropriate to examine the importance of the private
interest and the harm to this interest occasioned by
delay; the justification offered by the Government for
delay and its relation to the underlying governmental
interest; and the likelihood that the interim decision
may have been mistaken.208
Here, the private interest is the individual’s right to possess a
firearm. The government’s interest is public safety. So long as an
204
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intended transferee’s livelihood is not substantially affected by the
brief deprivation prior to the hearing, a thirty-day delay should suffice.
And while there can be no doubt that individuals will be erroneously
deprived during this delay, their interest is arguably outweighed by the
government’s interest in protecting the public. On the other hand,
should the DOJ find no reason to delay the transfer of a firearm, the
transaction may proceed at the discretion of the FFL.
Section three discusses the procedure for the Attorney General
should (s)he petition a firearm transfer. At any point during, or before
the conclusion of, the thirty-day delay the Attorney General may file a
petition within a court of competent jurisdiction to prevent the transfer.
The petition and the subsequent hearing shall receive the highest
possible priority on the docket so that the hearing will be held no more
than 60 days from an intended transferee’s initial attempt to purchase a
firearm. Section four discusses the procedural due process afforded to
an intended transferee. Aligned with the standards of due process, a
transferee will receive actual notice of the hearing and will be
provided an opportunity to participate with legal counsel.
Section five of the proposal sets forth the standard for denying a
firearm transfer. Here, the court shall grant the petition, denying the
transfer, if it determines that there is reasonable cause to believe, under
all of the circumstances, that the intended transferee is a threat to
public safety, or has or will commit an act of terrorism. Feinstein’s
proposal offered a reasonable suspicion standard, and Cornyn’s
probable cause. As Congress failed to agree on these competing
standards, this proposal offers a reasonable cause standard which finds
resolution somewhere in the middle. As discussed supra, the Supreme
Court found a “reasonable grounds” standard to be acceptable for a
probationary scheme where “special needs” made probable cause
impractical.209 Furthermore, the Court held a “reasonableness”
standard to be acceptable where the balancing of governmental and
private interests would be better served.210 Introducing a unique
standard applicable to individuals on the TWL comports with the
Supreme Court’s decisions in Griffin and T.L.O., and is justified to
safeguard the public from harm.
The final section of the amendment, section six, equates the denial
of a firearm transfer to violations under 18 U.S.C., § 922 (g) or (n). As
209
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indicated supra, prior to FFLs transferring a firearm to a transferee, the
NICS will be contacted to see whether the transfer will violate 18
U.S.C., § 922 (g) or (n), which makes it unlawful to transfer a firearm
to an individual for a wide range of reasons.211 Such reasons include
transferring a firearm to persons who are fugitives; persons who have
been adjudicated as a mental defective; persons who are aliens and
illegally or unlawfully in the United States; or persons convicted for
using or possessing a controlled substance within a certain time period
to possess or receive any firearm.212 However, nowhere among the
prohibitive conditions does it state that it is unlawful to transfer a
firearm to a known or suspected terrorist. So, under this proposal, a
court finding it reasonable to believe that an individual is likely to
engage in act of terrorism will be equivalent to those violations
enumerated under U.S.C., § 922 (g) or (n).
This proposal, while not perfect, demonstrates that there is room
for compromise. Congress can and should enact legislation which calls
for a stricter procedure for when individuals on, or recently removed
from, the TWL attempt to purchase firearms. Nevertheless, Congress
fails to work as a bipartisanship. Perhaps the lack of successful
regulations stem from Congress being influenced by special interest
groups and gun lobbyists. Whatever the reason may be, Congress’s
failure to act is unsupportable. As Scalia stated in Heller, an
individual’s right to possess firearms secured under the Second
Amendment is not limitless.213 Specifically, Scalia declared: “nothing
in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on . . . laws imposing
conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.” 214
Such language provides the basis for Congress to construct conditions
and qualifications pertaining to the transfer of firearms to individuals
on, or recently removed from, the TWL. Accordingly, it is time for
Congress to go to work.
CONCLUSION
Congress’ failure to work in unison to pass common sense gun
regulation is unacceptable. Rather than working constructively to
211
212
213
214

About NICS, supra note 61.
18 U.S.C. § 922(g), (n).
Heller, 554 U.S. at 595.
Id. at 626-27.

410

UMass Law Review

v. 12 | 376

produce a supportable proposal, Democrats and Republicans appear
more interested in criticizing one another. Such behavior is
exemplified in Congress’ inability to approve one of the four
amendments proposed between December 2015 and June 2016. As a
result of Congress’ failure in passing legislation to prevent known or
suspected terrorists from legally purchasing firearms, the doors remain
open for such individuals to commit more attacks.
Working in a bipartisan manner, Congress needs to construct,
support, and approve gun regulations that disallow known or suspected
terrorists on, or recently removed from, the TWL from legally
purchasing firearms in the United States. Sitting in the position to do
so, and equipped with the necessary legislative tools, the time for
Congress to act is now. The country has waited long enough.

